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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 910165 
v. : 
KEELEY L. ROWE, : Priority No. 14 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In defendant's Statement of the Case (Br. of Respondent 
at 4), defendant alleges that she "was not granted the opportunity 
to be heard and either present a reply or evidence in opposition to 
the state's [sic] assertions" that defendant lacked a sufficient 
expectation of privacy in a third party's home to challenge a 
search warrant issued for the home.1 This statement is not 
supported by the record. 
Pretrial, defendant submitted a written motion to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant and a 
memorandum in support of the motion (R. 28-41). Defendant did not 
request oral argument or schedule an evidentiary hearing on the 
matter. After the State submitted its response to the motion and 
consistent with rule 4-501.8, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
1
 The same claim is repeated at other points in defendant's 
brief. See Br. of Respondent at 9-10. 
1 
which allows decisions without hearing, the court issued a written 
order denying the motion (R. 51-55, 60-61). Defendant did not 
object to the order or request pretrial reconsideration of the 
denial. 
During trial, at the close of the State's case-in-chief, 
defendant again moved to suppress the evidence seized (T. 104). 
The State argued that defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the 
search warrant of the third party home (T. 105-6).2 Defendant's 
counsel argued that she did (T. 105-108). The court again denied 
the motion to suppress (T. 108). 
Based on the record, defendant was provided with full 
opportunities to present any issues regarding her motion to 
suppress. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE 
STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION 
OF THE STATUTORY NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT 
PROVISION 
The State in its opening brief extensively argued that 
the court of appeals erroneously concluded that the exclusionary 
rule was applicable to a procedural violation of the nighttime 
2
 The term "standing" was used by the trial prosecutor (T. 
105-06). Analytically, the correct inquiry is whether defendant 
had a sufficient "expectation of privacy" in the premises such that 
her personal constitutional rights were violated by the entry and 
authorized search of her host's home. See Petitioner's Opening 
Brief, Point II at 19 n.7, for distinctions between traditional 
procedural concepts of standing and modern substantive fourth 
amendment law. Accord United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669-
70 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[f]ourth amendment standing is quite 
different, however, from 'case or controversy' determinations of 
article III standing"). 
2 
search warrant provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990)- See 
Petitioner's Opening Brief, Point I at 8-17, In his responsive 
brief, defendant failed to address this issue. Instead, defendant 
merely assumes that "[suppression is the only remedy available" 
for any violation of statutory provisions governing the execution 
of search warrants (Br. of Respondent at 10). Defendant then 
recites, without further legal analysis or support, the conclusions 
of the majority's opinion that suppression is mandated (Br. of 
Respondent at 18-21). 
Such a conclusion is contrary to the majority view that 
a violation of a nighttime search provision does not generally rise 
to a constitutional level. See Petitioner's Opening Brief, Point 
I at 8-17. Ci. People v. Acevedo, 579 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1992) ("[a]lthough the failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements for obtaining a nighttime search warrant 
does not justify the suppression of the evidence where there exists 
a basis for the nighttime search, . . . where there does not exist 
any basis for the nighttime search, the search [is] invalid and 
must be suppressed"). 












Point I of Respondent's brief corresponds to Point II of 
Petitioner's Opening Brief in which the State argued that the court 
of appeals erroneously concluded that the status of being an 
invited social guest in a third party home vests the guest with a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence such that the 
3 
guest has the right to challenge the validity of a search warrant 
for the home. In her brief, defendant asserts several points which 
require comment. 
First, defendant argues that if this Court were to 
conclude that she lacked a constitutional expectation of privacy in 
the Swickey home that the case should be remanded to the trial 
court to allow defendant "an opportunity to be heard on that issue 
at an evidentiary hearing" (Br. of Respondent at 10). 
Presumptively, defendant predicates this request on her claim that 
the trial court improperly denied her an opportunity to present 
evidence in support of her motion to suppress. As discussed above, 
defendant was given ample opportunity to respond to the State's 
argument in the trial court (Petitioner's Reply Brief at 1-2). 
Accord State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 735 (Utah App. 1991) (copy 
attached to Petitioner's Opening Brief). 
Second, defendant concedes that she is not arguing for a 
separate state constitutional analysis (Br. of Respondent at 11-
12). This Court is limited, therefore, to consideration of 
defendant's federal constitutional rights. See Petitioner's 
Opening Brief, Point II at 22 n.9. Accord State v. Ramirez, 817 
P. 2d 774, 785 (Utah 1991) (appellate court will not consider 
separate state constitutional analysis if the parties have not 
argued for it). 
Third, defendant's inference that she was acting as a 
hostess and "preparing (heating) drinks for all the guests" (Br. of 
Respondent at 13) is a factual allegation never argued to the trial 
4 
court or the court of appeals and contains no record cite in 
support. Instead, the majority of the court of appeals found that 
defendant was a merely a social guest at a party. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
at 735-36. 
Fourth, defendant asserts that her legitimate expectation 
of privacy in her personal property, her purse, satisfies the issue 
of her right to challenge the entry into the home (Br. of 
Respondent at 14-15). This is incorrect. 
The State has never claimed that defendant theoretically 
lacked an expectation of privacy in her personal property. 
Instead, the State's position has consistently been that defendant 
abandoned her personal constitutional interest by disclaiming 
ownership in the purse and leaving it in the home knowing that a 
search was about to commence (Petitioner's Opening Brief, Point III 
at 29-30). Whether a person has an interest in an item of personal 
property left in a third party's home, does not address the issue 
of that person's expectation of privacy in the home itself. 
Defendant's failure to understand this distinction is 
exemplified by her assertion that Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 97 
(1980), supports her claim of a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the home (Br. of Respondent at 14-15). Just the opposite. 
Rawlings, decided the same day as United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83 (1980), made clear that after Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128 (1978), a defendant challenging a search and seizure on fourth 
amendment grounds must establish that "he or she possessed a 
'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the area searched." 
5 
Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. at 104. This substantive inquiry rejects "the 
notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the 
ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Jji. at 
105. Accord Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91 (" [t]he person in legal 
possession of a good seized during an illegal search has not 
necessarily been subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation"). 
Here, defendant has established nothing more than that she was 
legitimately on the premises when entry was made pursuant to an 
arrest warrant for the owner of the home and a contemporaneous 
search warrant. This is an insufficient basis to establish a 
constitutional expectation of privacy in the home. See 
Petitioner's Opening Brief, Point II at 21-29. Accord United 
States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067, 1069-71 (6th Cir. 1992) (boyfriend 
who had key to his girlfriend's apartment but was only transient 
guest at the time of the search did not have constitutional 
expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge police entry into 
the apartment); Davasher v. State, 823 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Ark. 1992) 
(son lacked expectation of privacy in his mother's home in which he 
was an invited guest). 
REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
DISCUSSING ABANDONMENT 
Point II of respondent's brief corresponds with Point III 
of Petitioner's Opening Brief in which the State argued that the 
court of appeals erroneously concluded that evidence of abandonment 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and 
erroneously applied a subjective standard by requiring that 
"abandonment in the fourth amendment sense" could only be 
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established if the State proved that defendant did not abandon the 
property to "avoid self-incrimination" (Petitioner's Opening Brief, 
Point III at 29-33). 
Defendant, while summarily quoting without attribution 
the majority opinion's erroneous comments concerning the subjective 
nature of abandonment, does expressly concede that M[t]he test is 
an objective one," focusing on the intent which may be reasonably 
inferred from the "words spoken, acts done, and other objective 
facts" (Br. of Respondent at 16 and 17, quoting United States v. 
Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). This is consistent 
with the overwhelming majority view that "the test to be applied in 
determining whether a person has abandoned property is an objective 
one - the words used, the conduct exhibited, and other objective 
facts such as where and for what length of time the property is 
relinquished and the condition of the property." O'Shaughnessv v. 
State, 420 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. App. 1982). See also cases cited 
in Petitioner's Opening Brief at 31-32. Neither defendant nor the 
majority opinion have cited any legal support for the contention 
that this inquiry involves an evaluation of a defendant's motive in 
abandoning property to avoid self-incrimination. 
Further, without any citation to the record, defendant 
contends that abandonment cannot be supported because she "did not 
intend to give up ownership of her purse and its contents to Mr. 
Swickey," claiming that " [i]t is more likely that under the stress 
of the situation and her haste to leave the stressful situation of 
a police search of a home, she merely forgot her purse" (Br. of 
7 
Respondent at 16). Not only do these allegations lack record 
support but they are contrary to the majority opinion's conclusion 
that defendant intentionally abandoned her purse to avoid self-
incrimination. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736-37. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments in the Petitioner's Opening Brief 
and the arguments presented here, the decision of the court of 
appeals should be reversed and defendant's conviction affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (cUh day of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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